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This thesis is foremost a thoroughgoing critique of 
the metaphysical assumptions of orthodox Western sociology. 
The critique extends into the theoretical and methodological 
consequences upon interpreting reality. Having demonstrated 
the uselessness of orthodox social inquiry in these dimen­
sions, an experimental methodology and theory are generated 
using a dialectical metaphysical position as a starting 
point.
Several examples of the writings of socially critical 
authors were analyzed as part of the project. The main con­
clusion reached was that there was an affinity between the 
various metaphysical stances of the authors and those of 
orthodox sociology. The case was made that this metaphysical 
affinity was a result of the ability of capitalist social 
organization to assign to itself a supra-historical character 
through the process of reification. Finally it was posited 
that only a dialectical analytical position can provide a 
perspective which can accurately depict the social relations 
of capitalism for what they are, a transitory form of social 
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Divergent and vehemently opposing opinions have 
emerged as to what the nature of theoretical concern and 
(by way of more than coincidence) methodology of social 
inquiry should be. Without resorting to extended discourse 
into the history of social thought, the purpose of this 
thesis will be to bring analysis to bear upon this bifurca­
tion of intellectual purpose. This development in present 
day sociology can be traced back to the mid-eighteenth 
century and the origins of modern social thought. George 
Lictheim in his essay "What is History?" addresses himself 
to the question of this process. In discussing the idea 
that contemporary social sciences are outgrowths of the 
advent of philosophical history, he notes that
. . . it was taken up and converted into a rudimentary 
sociology by Saint-Simon, Fourier and Comte. . . .
But we still need to be told exactly what the term 
"philosophy of history" was meant to convey. Voltaire, 
Condorcet, and the other pioneers clearly supposed that 
they were describing mankind’s emergence from barbarism 
to civilization. Their successors became progressively 
more modest. As time went on, they narrowed their field 
of vision from the whole of human history to that of 
Western Europe, then to the history of particular insti­
tutions and finally to their own age. Then it occurred 
to someone that the business of the historian was itself 
an interesting subject, worthy of sustained thought. 
"Philosophy of history" thus came to mean "reflection 
upon the writing of history", rather than concern with 
the historical process (if there was one). By now the 
circle is closed: historians are so busy writing about 
historiography that they scarcely have time left to con­
sider what actually happened. As for philosophers, their 
task has been redefined for them; it is no longer to 
write about the meaning of history but to ascertain what 
historians have thought of it.l
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Subject to the same factors responsible for this transition 
in the parent, the child of philosophical history has sadly 
endured an analagous fate. The task of Western sociology 
has similarly been deflected from the ends of its forebears: 
rather than coming to grips with the evolution and dynamics 
of the social process, the present condition of the profes­
sion is satisfied mainly with reflection upon and celebra­
tion of itself.
Here, rather than offer an analysis of the develop­
ment of metaphysics, we will posit a typological scheme in 
order to identify the distinctions within opposing meta­
physical positions. The major theoretical device which will 
be utilized throughout this analysis, the concept of the 
dialectic, is a multi-edged sword and its versality as an 
analytical tool is necessarily remarkable. We will argue 
and demonstrate that dialectical thought is the only suit­
able vehicle for rationality to deal with large questions of 
human existence and make sense. Conversely, it should be 
noted here that we also intend to explore the non-dialectical 
(and consequently non-sensical) nature of contemporary 
Western sociology below.2
The process of dichotomization of outlook in con­
temporary sociology is itself a result of a dialectical 
split in terms of metaphysical legitimacy. The nature of 
this metaphysical polarization and possibilities for its 
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resolution are the ultimate issues with which this analysis, 
in several round-about ways, will be concerned. It will also 
be argued that a whole, human metaphysics can deal adequately 
with the larger questions of existence if not subjected to 
the twisted criteria of an overpowering, pathalogical surro­
gate. Thus it is being argued that the theoretical meaning­
lessness and methodological position enforced by orthodox 
Western sociology is itself a product of the dialectical 
nature of the universe.
The fact of the existence of this diatribe is (or 
should be to the perceptive reader) a tacit acknowledgement 
of the power of the endeavor to command methodological/theo- 
retical orthodoxy at this point in time. To acknowledge its 
power is not to acknowledge its truth. To admit its hegemony 
is not to admit its validity. In an urgent sense the purpose 
of this investigation will be to contribute to the reversal 
of the ebb of intellectual spirit before the atrophy becomes 
terminal. A rapproachment of intellectual activity with 
worthwhile questions does not seem wholly out of the realm 
of desirability as a goal, though the feasibility of such may 
be soon limited by time.
The emergence of separate thought-styles with correspond­
ing universes of discourse has two consequences: each 
of these universes develops a paranoidal response to all 
others, since its exponents experience the existence of 
conflicting interpretation and views as a threat to the 
truth and rightness of their own universe of discourse. 
Second, the process of meaningful communication between 
these mutually distrustful universes come to a virtual 
standstill.
In attempting to systematically posit a comprehensive and 
coherent alternative to present day orthodoxy, efforts will 
be made to keep the communication level above that of a stand­
still and the response offered minimally rational enough to 
avoid the label "paranoidal".
The phenomena we are dealing with are easily identi­
fied and separated into respective camps. The duality of 
theoretical/methodological analytical outlooks polarize in a 
related way along both dimensions resulting in two distinc­
tive metaphysical outlooks. Theoretically the important 
declension occurs along an historical-existential continuum 
as relating to conceptual frameworks. This tendency operates 
to give the intellectual universe in the broadest sense 
either a dynamic or static character. Methodologically the 
critical dissociation occurs in assigning data either frag­
mentary or integral character. Again a picture is painted 
of a metaphysical universe which is either evolutionary or 
stationary in nature.
To abruptly pursue another tack now, we want to 
take a look at the practical results on applied social 
thought which derive from the fragmentary and existential 
dimensions of the orthodox metaphysics. In demonstrating 
that within the domain of social inquiry, two mutually 
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exclusive metaphysical positions are being generated, we may 
be trying contiguously to demonstrate the necessary (in the 
philosophical sense) connection between the two world views. 
An important factor, which we will investigate in a following 
chapter, relating to the question of declining aspiration in 
social explication is the context of the imperialist stage of 
capitalism which provides the social melieu for Western intel­
lectual activity. The minds which are both products of and 
in turn reproduce the sociology of this lame metaphysical 
base are the ones which Herbert Marcuse has called one dimen­
sional or C. Wright Mills called sociologically unimaginative. 
The reason of this debilitated position is the reason Leszek 
Kolakowski has called alienated.
Circuitously we have begun superficially to examine 
one facet of the virtually inexhaustible supply of questions 
and perspectives suggested by Marx's historical, dialectical 
concept of alienation. Below we will move toward a more 
specific definition of the term; for the time being let it 
suffice to say that the a-historical, fragmented and static 
metaphysics of Western sociology has become alienated from 
the dynamic historical totality of the universe which is the 
central fact of existence. Here it is being argued that in 
relation to the concept of a dialectical metaphysics alien­
ation is the driving force behind this dynamism, the 
sustaining impetus as mankind evolves through history.
6.
We intend, at a later point, to attempt to demon­
strate the value and viability of this concept as an ana­
lytical tool. Before proceeding however, as a further 
validation of the preceeding critique of orthodox sociology, 
it would be well to examine briefly the relationship between 
the application of the concept of alienation by the orthodox, 
and the theoretical and methodological contortions which have 
been necessitated to render it harmless. As we will determine 
later on, a dialectical application of the concept of alien­
ation is anything but harmless to established reality. As 
we have pointed out above - theoretically, operationalism, 
and methodologically, reductionism are major factors leading 
to the present co-optation of the metaphysical underpinnings 
of social science. How, we want to ask, have these trends 
affected the concept of alienation practically?
Herbert Marcuse has given important insights into 
the nature of operationalism as it functions to innervate the 
formulation of critical theory. Marcuse would say that a 
dialectical notion of the concept of alienation is one which 
has transitive meaning. By this he means that
. . . all cognitive concepts have a transitive meaning: 
they go beyond descriptive reference to particular facts. 
And if the facts are those of society, the cognitive con­
cepts also go beyond any particular context of the facts 
—into the processes and conditions on which the respec­
tive society rests, and which enter into all particular 
facts, making, sustaining, and destroying the society. 
By virtue of their reference to this historical totality, 
cognitive concepts transcend all operational context, but 
their transcendence is empirical because it renders the facts recognizable as that which they really are.^
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Joachim Israel, in a comprehensive survey of the concept of 
alienation, deals with the fate of transitive meaning at the 
hands of empiricists.
. . . the concept of alienation is not unambiguous. In 
fact, usually it covers two completely different catego­
ries of phenomena. One comprises social processes, the 
other psychological states which need not necessarily be 
consequences of these social processes.
The psychological conditions or states play a rela­
tively unimportant role in the theories of Marx. The 
emphasis in his theories is on social processes and their 
effect. In empirically oriented sociology, however, a 
central role is played by the psychological state of alien­
ation, the individual's estrangement. The individual's 
experience of his own situation is the object of investi­
gation against the background of sociological phenomena. 
In addition, more or less clearly expressed values and 
other types of presuppositions constitute the foundation 
for the description and analysis of the psychological as 
well as the sociological conditions. The social criti­
cism, which is of so much importance to Marx, disappears 
almost completely in these studies. The social struc­
ture of society is often accepted in its current shape. 
The possibilities of the individual for social adjustment 
are the starting point of the theories concerning alien­
ation, where alienation meaning "the experience of es­
trangement" often is percieved as being equal to the 
lack of social adjustment.5
Or as Marcuse would agree
Where these reduced concepts govern the analysis of 
the human reality, individual or social, mental or 
material, they arrive at a false concreteness—a concrete­
ness isolated from the conditions which constitute real­
ity. In this context, the operational treatment of the 
concept assumes a political function. The individual and 
his behavior are analyzed in a therapeutic sense—adjust­
ment to his society. Thought and expression, theory and 
practice are to be brought in line with the facts of his 
existence without leaving room for the conceptual cri­
tique of these facts.^ (my emphasis")
Thus we begin to understand the connection between alienated 
theory and method. Theory which rejects the ideas of 
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historical development of social processes in turn must rede­
fine ”objectivity" as well. The concern with alienation as a 
psychological process of maladjustment is a horse of an en­
tirely different color than the notion that alienation is a 
product of a specific set of contradictory social relations 
present in capitalism and is the dynamic of revolution to 
resolve those contradictions. The immediacy of existential, 
static metaphysics, is mediated through non-transitive con­
ceptual frameworks and ultimately imprints a subjective 
character upon supposedly "objective” data. Once this meta­
physical imperative has been established, the orthodox can 
use this hegemonial definition of data as a sort of tauto­
logical circle to further circumscribe questions of society 
as only being ones about which "objective" data can be 
secured. " . . . once the •unrealistic* excess of meaning is 
abolished, an investigation is locked within the vast confine 
in which the established society validates and invalidates 
propositions. By virtue of its methodology empiricism is 
ideological."''7 The excesses and complications, the general­
izations of historical, total metaphysics must be avoided. 
Israel correctly elaborates the process.
Positivistic and empirically oriented sociology is at the 
onset much more careful. It tries anxiously to avoid 
large, sweeping generalizations and tries instead to 
anchor its theses in empirical data. This sociology is 
microsociology; it deals with definite well-delimited 
problems but not with society at large. Sometimes re­
search based upon this orientation has a tendency to 
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exclusiveness. One deals with minor problems often in an 
intriguing way, but sometimes it may be difficult to dis­
cover the relevance of the problems for sociology as a 
social science. The German philosopher and sociologist 
Adorno once characterized this type of sociology as 
"sociology minus society". An empirically oriented 
sociology can also mean that questions of methodology 
are considered to be more important than the problems to 
be studied. The consequence then will be that the methods 
are allowed to determine the problems which are to be 
studied and not—as it ought to be—the other way round.®
Up to this point we have been attempting to demonstrate the 
logical unity of a defective metaphysics and the generation 
of defective theoretical and methodological concomitants. As 
a basis for developing a critique of contemporary, bourgeois 
sociology we have been focusing attention upon one pole of the 
antimony. We want to try and pull this diverse analysis to­
gether with some relating thoughts which I have written in 
another place.
. . . at this point we begin to discern exactly the 
relationship between methodological fetishism, metaphys­
ical relativity: and corporate capitalism.
Bourgeois sociology must establish a method of social 
inquiry which does not call into question the fundamental 
presuppositions of capitalist society. The methodology 
is that of fetishism with detail. Sophisticated quantita­
tive research strategies which elevate factual data to a 
position of self-justification and statistically operate 
upon that data in such a way that it assumes an indepen­
dent reality by virtue of its mere existence, are the 
order of the day. And this order is not random, or even 
an "objective" survival of the scientifically fittest. 
This exaggerated emphasis on detail is the means by which 
the totality of history is distorted. This elevation of 
a-historical detail is a distortion of reality, transitory 
fact is torn from its developmental, evolutionary con­
tinuum and given an absolute existential meaning. To the 
extent that this distorted reality is reflected in re­
search, then research is merely a distorted reflection. 
The policy recommendations of such research regularly 
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confine themselves to the feasible limits of the existen­
tial situation even when those limitations dilenunatically 
frustrate human, rational solutions. These efforts inev­
itably conclude in, at best, reformism and a reinforcement 
of the status quo. It is against this obsession with de­
tail, this predetermined defeat of reason, with inherent 
rejection of historical alternatives which radicals and 
humans in sociology rail. It is within the context of 
this positivistic world of diminished possibilities that 
the separation and compartmentalization of theoretical 
scientific endeavor from practice occurs. For it is at 
this point the recognition is made by the orthodox that 
there must necessarily be no juncture made with a meta­
physical position in which historical alternatives exist. 
For in such a world as that it would be possible to call 
into question the validity of the isolated view of reality 
offered by orthodox society.9
The purpose of the preceeding exposition has been to 
open the way for justification of an analytical/theoretical 
position which is reanimated with the questions of social 
evolution and eschatology. Since the advent of philosophical 
history and its satellite disciplines, there has been a sub­
terranean alternative running parallel to this more visible 
process of degeneration and shrinking horizons. This alter­
native position is one which relies heavily upon the Marxian- 
Hegelian lineage of thought. The theory and methodology which 
this tradition of thought relies upon is a metaphysics which 
embraces the expanding historical horizon and uses the dialec­
tical process in the broadest sense to give meaning to history.
CHAPTER I NOTES 11.
^George Lictheim, Collected Essays (Viking Press, 
New York, 1973)» P- 39^-395* The idea of progress in 
the history of mankind is central to our thesis here and 
has been investigated extensively in other places by 
Lictheim. cf. George Lictheim, The Concept of Ideology 
(Vintage Books, New York, 196?). Here the apperaance of 
the historical treatment of consciousness is traced from 
the formulations of liberal French intellectuals of the 
Institut de France circa the establishment of the Republic 
to the currently confused situation we are attempting to 
clarify in this exercise.
2Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (Beacon 
Press, Boston, 1955)• For a scholarly analysis of the 
philosophical differences between the development of 
positivism and dialectical inquiry, Marcuse’s work is 
pedagogical in the most complimentary sense in following 
the logic and intent of the systems of thought involved 
with this process.
3Gunter Remmling, Road to Suspicion (Appleton- 
Century-Crofts, New York, 196?), P- 7-8. cf. C. Wright 
Mills, The Sociological Imagination (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1959)* Mills* analysis of the problem 
is thorough although limited and naive in the sense that he 
attempts to be a-political and value free in his criticisms. 
His analysis and critique not going beyond the framework 
of "science" dictates that the solution to the problem, 
too, is to be found in the non-ideological pursuit of 
"science" per se.
Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Beacon Press, 
Boston, 1964-), p. 106.
5Joachim Israel, Alienation (Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 
1971), p. 207.
^Marcuse, op cit.. p. 106-107.
7Ibid., p. 114.
^Israel, op cit., p. 206.
^Ernest Everhard, "Sociology of sociology at the 
U. of H.", Praxis, Vol. I, No. I, April 1974, p. 4.
CHAPTER II.
Thus far we have offered a critique of what we believe 
to be a specific, historically determined contenporary meta­
physical form. We have supported the position that, as a 
vehicle for meaningful social analysis, this mode of rational­
ity is rapidly approaching uselessness. We argue that the 
theoretical and methodological concomitants of this meta­
physic necessarily expedite obfuscation and confusion in under­
standing and making sense of social phenomena. We have tried 
to insinuate the connection between the hypostatized represen­
tation of history and social processes and, more practically, 
the interest of orthodox sociology in reproducing and reinforc­
ing economic and political "equilibrium".
Here we briefly want to examine the fundamental con­
servative nature of the orthodox metaphysics as it interpene­
trates processes at different levels of abstraction. We mean 
to say that the dynamic equilibrium of the orthodox sociology, 
dependent upon norming processes, etc., is in fact static and 
absolute. The power of the orthodox metaphysic to enforce 
methodological and theoretical imperatives ultimately dictates 
what constitutes "objective" data and "answerable" queations. 
Further, if conflicting data con be declared "non-objective" 
or uncomfortable questions "outside theoretical scope", then 
what is superficially a dynamic "equilibrium" turns out to 
be in fact a static "absolute".
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When analyses attempting to answer uncomfortable questions, 
which use non-objective (in the sense of non-orthodox) data 
for support can be characterized largely, in the view of the 
author, as polemical, a trend seems to emerge. The social 
analysis based on orthodox metaphysics is in this indirect 
way a defender of the economic and political regularities of 
the unarticulated, but no less real, absolute which is the 
true character of dynamic equilibrium. In this way orthodox 
sociology is organized and mobilized to decry as "scientifi­
cally illegitimate" attempts at analysis which would in any 
way undermine the basic presuppositions of imperialist society.
Orthodoxy in sociology has branded as negative or 
nihilistic within the organized discipline what could be 
called, in a practical analogue, anarchistic within the 
judicial-political realm. This example is intended to demon­
strate the existence and character of the ideological constel­
lation of the orthodox metaphysic as a connection establishing 
continuity between the "value free" science of the metaphysic 
and the "democratic" evolution of the society practically.
We believe that in attempting an exposition of the 
alternative position, we can characterize the negative conno­
tations ascribed to the polemical attacks of critical writers 
as basically correct. There is little common ground between 
the two perspectives and seems to be getting less as time 
goes on. We intend to investigate the possibilities of the 
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alternative position theoretically and methodologically to 
counteract the stagnation and fragmentation of the world we 
have attributed to orthodox analysis. We posit the develop­
ment of dialectical analysis as it originated with Hegel and 
has been revised by Marx and his successors as the main demon 
against which the epithet of nihilism is spat.
Hegel’s philsosphy is indeed what the subsequent reaction 
termed it, a negative philosophy. It is originally moti­
vated by the conviction that the given facts that appear 
to common sense as the positive index of truth can only 
be established by their destruction. The driving force of 
the dialectical method lies in this critical conviction.1
Classically, the simplistic triad of thesis, antithesis and 
synthesis is used to describe Hegel’s dialectic. We must 
delve deeper into this formulation for the needs of our 
analysis here. The polarization of the world, or for the sake 
of our purpose say social reality, into thesis and antithesis 
derives from a primary organic integrity of the world. The 
struggle for synthetic reunion between the positive and neg­
ative tendencies of phenomena is the process and dynamism of 
the dialectic. The tension between thesis and antithesis 
prior to resolution and synthesis is termed alienation. This 
notion of alienation is, as we shall see, multiform and flex­
ible to an extreme in possibilities for application to theo­
retical and analytical projects. We mean 
Hegelian-Marxist concept of alienation is 
itive meaning. This transitive character 




metaphysic of the dialectic will have corresponding ramifica­
tions on theory and method. Further we believe as stated 
above that as the alienation of social inquiry from its 
potentially liberating role, i.e., as a vehicle for greater 
truth and insight, continues—that so increases the potential 
for intellectual revolution and rejection of the defunct 
paradigm of the orthodox metaphysic.
Herbert Marcuse, in writing of Hegel, addresses him­
self to the complicated question of describing the metaphysi­
cal character of the dialectical process and the relationships 
of this metaphysics to objectivity.
Hegel does not mean that everything that exists does so 
in conformity with its potentialities, but that the mind 
has attained the self-consciousness of its freedom, and 
become capable of freeing nature and society. The real­
ization of reason is not a fact but a task. The form in 
which the objects immediately appear is not yet their 
true form. What is simply given is at first negative, 
other than its real potentialities. It becomes true only 
in the process of overcoming this negativity, so that the 
birth of truth requires the death of the given state■of 
being.2
The given state of being in contemporary orthodox 
social inquiry is a product of the same idealism found in 
Hegel’s concept of the dialectic that later provided the 
ideological foundations of Prussian Germany, the Absolute 
state. Having been divorced from practical activity for a 
number of decades now, contemporary sociology as an intel­
lectual activity has succeeded in undertaking to create for 
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itself a closed, absolute universe of discourse and inquiry.
We must follow Marx and his revision of Hegel in order to 
determine the spurious nature of the claims made by this 
dialectical idealism we have been describing.
It was up to Marx to first, stand Hegel on his head, 
and then turn the dialectical method upon history itself.
Marx posited that instead of Hegel’s idealistic conception 
of self-conscious reason as the agency of negativity, that 
materially grounded, class conscious reason generated by 
alienation to specific, concrete situations through evolu­
tionary history was the dynamic of society.
Criticizing Hegel in The Holy Family, Marx notes:
As Hegel puts self-consciousness in the place of man, 
the most varied human reality appears only as a definite 
form, as a determination of self-consciousness. But a 
mere determination of self-consciousness is a "pure 
category", a mere "thought" which I can consequently 
also abolish in "pure** thought and overcome through pure 
thought. In Hegel’s Phenomenology the material, percep­
tible, objective bases of the various estranged forms of 
human self-consciousness are left as they are. Thus the 
whole destructive work results in the most conservative 
philosophy because it thinks it has overcome the objective 
world, the sensuously real world, by merely transforming 
it into a "thing of thought", a mere determination of 
self-consciousness and can therefore dissolve its opponent 
which has become ethereal,.in the "ether of pure thought".-
In The German Ideology Marx writes that
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends 
from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. 
That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, im­
agine, concieve, nor from men as narrated, thought of, 
imagined, concieved, in order to arrive at men in the 
flesh. We set out from real active men, and on the basis 
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of their real life-process we demonstrate the development 
of th^ ideological reflexes and echos of this life pro-
Relavant to our line of thought here, what we believe Marx 
to be instructing is that the task of reason is to critically 
expose the contradictions and shortcomings of the real world 
relative to the parameters of possibility. This suggestion 
runs counter to the case of orthodox sociology which aims at 
the converse, namely to reconcile social conditions with some 
conception of ideal based upon a non-critical interpretation 
of society. And certainly not the least of these facets is 
the job of discovering the material limitations and determin­
ations operating upon reason itself. Thus much of current 
social research has had any intention of practical and intel­
lectual unity subjugated by the realities of the existential 
facts and power relationships of society. Contemporary 
sociology has done exactly what Marx would have predicted. 
The discipline has begun to concern itself with explaining 
away contradictions and rationalizing of the absolute meta­
physical presuppositions of imperialism. Rather than main­
tain a critical theoretical position which could interpret 
practical society, orthodox sociology has allowed practical 
society to incorporate social theory into its political and 
ideological service.
Marx is unequivocal as to the evolutionary, socio- 
historical character of the life-process which shapes the 
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consciousness of man and is the dynamo of the-dialectical 
process.
. . . observation must . . . bring out empirically and 
without any mystification and speculation, the connection 
of the social and political structure with production. 
The social structure and the State are continually evolv­
ing out of the life-process of definite individuals, but 
not of individuals as they may appear in their own or 
other people’s imagination but as they really are, i.e., 
as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they 
work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will.5
To better appreciate how Marx’s application of materialism 
and historocity to dialectics inject animation into our alter­
native metaphysics, we must briefly follow some of Marx's 
observations concerning the productive process. Earlier we 
discussed the idea that alienation supplies the kinetic energy 
of the dialectic. Alienation was the concrete manifestation 
of the metaphysical tension resulting from the polarization 
of the organic unity of the social world into reality and 
potentiality. We must wonder, of course, what is the primal 
mover so to speak in this process of polarization. The pro­
cess of alienation of the world from man and concomitantly 
the process of realization of some ultimate reunification is 
seen by Marx to lie in the nature of man and his unique abil­
ity to consciously operate upon the world. Thus as nature 
provides the means of existence to man, as he operates upon 
and appropriates nature to concretely exist, the process of 
appropriation simultaneously is the process by which the ex­
ternal world is alienated from man.
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. . . the more the worker ayproyriates the external 
world of the sensuous nature by his labor the more he 
deprives himself of means of existence, in two respects: 
first, that the sensuous external world becomes progres­
sively less an abject belonging to his labor or a means 
of existence of his labor, and secondly, that it becomes 
progressively less a means of existence in the direct 
sense, a means for the physical subsistence of the worker.®
Reiterating, Marx writes in another place
. . , alienation appears not merely in the result but 
also in the process of production, within productive 
activity itself. How could the worker stand in an 
alien relationship to the product of his activity if he 
did not alienate himself in the act of production itself? 
The product is indeed only the resume of activity, of pro­
duction. Consequently, if the product of labor is alien­
ation, production itself must be active alienation  
The alienation of the object of labor merely summarizes 
the alienation in the work activity itself.7
The final step in Marx’s argument is to identify the realiza­
tion of alienation as it culminates in the relation between 
the worker and the capitalist, in the institution of private 
property.
If he is related to the product of his labour, his objec­
tified labour, as to an alien, hostile, powerful and in­
dependent object, he is related in such a way that another 
alien, hostile, powerful and independent man is the lord 
of this object. If he is related to his own activity as 
to unfree activity, then he is related to it as activity 
in the service, and under the domination, coercion, and 
yoke of another man.
Only in the final stage of development of private 
property is its secret revealed, namely, that it is on 
the one hand the product of alienated labour, and on the 
other hand the means by which labour is alienated, the 
realization of this alienation.8
We have deemed it necessary to closely follow the argument 
concerning the moment of polarization within the dialectical 
process for a number of reasons. The most important, however, 
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is to prepare ourselves to make a number of seemingly fine 
metaphysical distinctions.which will prove to be obvious and 
central on the practical level.
For instance, C. Wright Mills tendered bitter criti­
cism against orthodox sociology on metaphysical grounds. Yet 
in posing the problem of what he called sociological imagina­
tion, he posited a dialectic between "abstracted empiricism" 
and "grand theory". While he did recognize the reciprocity 
of interest emerging between social science and capitalist 
hegemony, he seems to have viewed this development as more of 
a chance correlation than as a necessary symbiosis. Here we 
mean to show that rather than by some coincidence, the dichot­
omy of metaphysical outlooks is the necessary product of 
alienated intellectual activity as it has become realized in 
the context of imperialism. The Marxist notion of alienation 
and the polarization of the dialectical moment is the only 
perspective vzhich can account realistically for the division 
of outlooks and their respective theoretical and methodolog­
ical approaches. While we do not hold the opinion that 
orthodox sociology is merely a gross epiphenomenon of the 
capitalist system of which it is a part, we do mean to illum­
inate the mutual dependences and interests which have emerged 
concurrently as a product of their metaphysical affinity.
The end point of our digression is to expound the 
fundamental differences between the fragmented, existential 
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social science of imperialism on the one hand and the organic,, 
historical character of our alternative position. We have 
been trying to show how the concept of alienation as utilized 
by these positions respectively has totally diametrical mean­
ing. One position would have us believe that alienation is 
an unresolvable by-product of the technological character 
of social evolution—alienation as a quantitative phenomenon.
The other sees alienation as the product not of technology 
per se but rather as an integral process which is both the 
problem and the solution to a specific historical form of 
social organization--namely capitalism.
Above we have discussed the idea that in Marx's view 
social and physical phenomena formed an organic whole, that 
the basic nature of the world is integral and harmonious. 
Man is seen as a universal; social organization is seen as 
horizontal rather than hierarchial.
The universality of man appears in practice in the uni­
versality which makes the vzhole of nature into his inorgan­
ic body; (1) as a direct means of life; and equally (2) 
as the material object and instrument of his life activity. 
Nature is the inorganic body of man; that is to say nature, 
excluding the human body itself. To say that man lives 
from nature means that nature is his body with which he 
must remain in a continuous interchange in order not to 
die. The statement that the physical and mental life of 
man, and nature, are interdependent means simply that 
nature is interdependent with itself, for man is a part 
of nature.9
Yet as a result of the process of appropriation and the 
realization of this process in the capitalist social structure, 
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man’s identity with his nature is alienated, he becomes 
separated from his environment mentally and physically. In 
a parenthetical remark, Marx describes the outcome of the 
disruption of the unity and harmony of the organic unit.
(The alienation of the worker in his object is expressed 
as follows in the laws of political economy; the more the 
worker produces the less he has to consume; the more 
value he creates the more worthless he becomes; the more 
refined his product the more crude and misshapen the 
worker; the more civilized the product the more barbarous 
the worker; the more powerful the work the more feeble 
the worker; the more the work manifests intelligence the 
more the worker declines in intelligence and becomes a 
slave of nature.)10
We believe that the alienation manifested in the 
theory and method of orthodox sociology, manifested in the 
rejection of a holistic and transitive approach to research 
and analysis has resulted in the vitiation and atrophy of 
this intellectual form. We believe that salvation of the 
discipline must start with a return to the dialectical 
method. Once having made the critical reinterpretations of 
Hegel's system, Marx went on to develop his own theory of 
social evolution based on historical materialism and the 
dialectical method.
It is in this spirit that the author here is attempt­
ing to demonstrate the necessity of returning to the roots 
of sociology. Only in this way can the contemporary enter­
prise be rescued from its present state of stagnation. It 
is in this spirit that the author will be attempting to 
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apply the dialectical method, to reanimate the critical 
question of human existence, and to contribute to the process 
by which social inquiry might reunite with its intended 
function of providing meaningful insights into the process 
of social evolution. The remainder of this exercise will be 
aimed at forging a new analytical paradigm capable of enter­
taining the complex questions we find lacking in the orthodoxy.
Early on in this section we raised the question of 
nihilism as a descritpive device and noted the application 
by the orthodox to alternative analyses. Under other circum­
stances it could be interpreted as absurdity to feel compelled 
to defend historically grounded methodology which aims at 
discerning process and totality. Yet conceptual frameworks 
which are relevant and viable in terms of larger issues are 
at every turn attacked by those who possess no more than 
(to turn the criticism back upon itself) a self-generated 
nihilism. For there is no other accurate description than 
nihilism for an organized and conscious attempt to destroy 
history and ultimately humanity.
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The purpose of the foregoing comments has been to 
lay groundwork for the theoretical justification of using 
the dialectical method in social analysis as opposed to the 
"more scientific” regimen of the positivistic orthodoxy. 
In this section we will attempt to generate some concrete 
dimensions both in the terms of theory and method for our 
alternative metaphysic. We will attempt to delineate some 
meaningful practical problem which may provide us with some 
insight as to the power and usefullness of dialectics in 
making sense of the social world. We want to define a way 
in which an analysis of the movement of consciousness (and 
if we may define consciousness as the social tension between 
reality and potentiality; we therefore mean to include the 
kinesis in the operation of the dialectic and therefore the 
movement of history) can be effected. The problem we set 
forth must be one which will both minimally determine the 
validity of some logically derivative theorem of dialectical 
metaphysics and at the same time not do violence to the 
methodological imperatives we have outlined. George Lukacs 
in discussing the writing of Engles on the subject observes 
that
Engles conceptualizes the dialectic by opposing it to 
the "metaphysical" conceptualization. He emphasizes with 
penetration the fact that, in the dialectic method, the 
rigidity of concepts (and of the objects which correspond 
to them) is dissolved, that the dialectic is the continu­
ous transformation of one determination into another, re­
solving contraries which pass into each other. And he
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argues that consequently, the unilateral, rigid causality 
must be replaced by reciprocal action. But the most es­
sential interaction, the dialectical relation of subject 
and object in the process of history, is not even mention­
ed, not to say placed in the very center of the method­
ological consideration where it belongs. Abstracted from 
this determination the dialectic method, in spite of any 
affirmation in the last instance of "fluid" concepts, 
ceased to be a revolutionary method. The difference 
between the dialectic and "metaphysics" should not then 
be sought in the fact that all metaphysical studies re­
quire the object of investigation to be untouched and 
unchanging, and that the conception consequently remains 
"contemplative. . . and cannot become practical, but is 
in fact that for the dialectic the central problem is 
the transformation of reality.
If one neglects this central function of the theory, 
then the advantage of a "fluid" conception becomes prob­
lematic, a purely "scientific" affair. The method can 
be accepted or rejected in accord with the state of 
science, but without changing one's attitude of reality, 
its "fatal" and unchanging character, its conformity to 
law in the sense of the bourgeois, contemplative material­
ism and its classical economics this can even be rein­
forced. . . .1
Within the domain of science generally (and sociology 
particularly) conventional treatment of the subject of art, 
when broached at all, is usually reluctant. Yet in attempt­
ing to frame a problem suitable to our purposes for analysis, 
to examine the subjective and objective interaction in the 
movement of history as process, we believe that some specific 
problems in the creative process can be formulated in such a 
way as to prove the power of illumination and scientific 
worth of the dialectic as method. Central to our thesis here, 
it will be argued that if one is concerned with the evolu­
tion and dynamics of society, an historical society; on 
which has a past, present, and future, that a theory of 
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art . . . a framework for the interpretation and evaluation 
of art as an ideological-cultural enterprise is essential.
In no other aesthetic does the truthful depiction of 
reality have so central a place as in Marxism. This is 
closely tied up with other elements in Marxist doctrine. 
For the Marxist the road to socialism is identical with 
the movement of history itself. There is no phenomenon, 
objective or subjective, that has not its function in 
furthering, obstructing or deviating this development.2
We mean to demonstrate the special position thas the artist 
occupies in his particular relationship to the creative 
process and in making concrete the subject-object tension 
and giving consciousness a specific, concrete representation. 
We mean to show how art is on the one hand a means (in the 
sense of functioning to concretize contradictions in social 
relations) to the realization of art as potentiality (artistic 
ethos). The dialectical character of alienated art is ex­
hibited through a representation of reality which is critical 
in that it is at the same time rooted in and yet transcends 
the existential limits of its production. We must assume the 
a priori critical nature of art in that until the point is 
achieved that contradictions in social relations no longer 
exist, art remains critical at least in the sense of de­
picting those contradictions and the (at least implicit) 
notion remains that contradictions can be resolved.
In his Essay on Liberation Herbert Marcuse projects 
a "new sensibility" in which art has transcended its "nega­
tive" (in the Hegelian sense) function and has become the 
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aspect under which existence is subsumed. Consciousness 
having funfilled its critical function, having turned the 
realm of potentiality into one of realization would mean the 
end of politics and would seem to be coincident with Marx’s 
idea of the end of pre-history.
The liberated consciousness would promote the development 
of a science and technology free to discover and realize 
the possibilities of things and men in the protection and 
gratification of life, playing with the potentialities of 
form and matter for the attainment of this goal. Tech­
nique would then tend to become art, and art would tend to 
form reality; the opposition between imagination and rea­
son, higher and lower faculties, poetic and scientific 
thought would be invalidated. Emergence of a new Reality 
Principle: under which a new sensibility and desublima­
ted scientific-intelligence would combine in the creation 
of an artistic ethos.3
Of course Marcuse will be the first to point out 
that what he is describing is, on the one hand, speculative 
and utopian by design. On the other, however, he would also 
argue that his projection is firmly grounded in empirical 
observation. We recognize the validity of his method and 
intend to modify it to our own needs. For we will attempt 
to demonstrate the crucial importance that an understanding 
of the movement of art towards its realization in Marcuse’s 
"artist ethos" plays in relationship to the movement of 
history and the realization of society in socialism.
The intention of the proposed analysis is to investi­
gate the relationship between art as a critical device with 
an existing milieu and its potential as a vehicle for a
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transformation of life as Marcuse has theorized. We want to 
ask in what ways, as history has progressed and reality been 
transformed, has artistic endeavor been able in some sense to 
anticipate and direct or predict change in society. In re­
maining within the bounds of the task before us (i.e., not 
taking the analysis to dissertation length) we have chosen to 
examine some aspects of the works of four authors. We have 
purposely chosen authors who form a sort of sequential pro­
gression in order to be able to give some sort of minimal 
historical perspective to our analysis. Using the idea of 
historical stages from political economy, we want for one 
thing to be able to see how the particular authors handled 
the objectively critical problems of the period in capitalist 
development about which they were writing.
As historical examples we have chosen to briefly 
analyze some aspects of the writings of Mark Twain as repre­
sentative of the period in which laissez-faire capitalism 
was in the process of throwing off the last vestiges of 
feudalism. Also the written social comment of Jack London 
will be examined. London was writing in the early 1900*s 
during the period of consolidation of monoply capitalism. 
Both these examples are calculated to provide the subjective 
data from periods of objectively massive social upheaval in 
America. It seems reasonable to expect that there will be 
continuities and similarities as well as significant 
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differences in the comparative treatment by the authors of 
the questions and problems outlined above. It is hoped that 
data from these examples can present thematic or gestaltic 
insight into the subjective processes accompanying these 
dynamic periods.
Returning to the point that the aim of art is the 
establishment of the artistic ethos of Marcuse. At present, 
art in contemporary American society is not the aspect under 
which men operate, but rather (as Marcuse notes in another 
place) art is circumscribed by a condition of total, fully 
developed imperialism.
The power of corporate capitalism has stifled the emer­
gence of such a consciousness and imagination; its mass 
media have adjusted the rational and emotional faculties 
to its market and its policies and steered them to the 
defense of its dominion. The narrowing of the consump­
tion gap has rendered possible the mental and instinctual 
coordination of the laboring classes; the majority of 
organized labor shares the stabilizing, counterrevolu­
tionary needs of the middle classes, as evidenced by 
their behavior as consumers of the material and cultural 
merchandise, by their emotional revulsion against the non-conformist intelligensia.24-
Thus the problem for consciousness becomes: what factors 
have been responsible for the frustration of the realization 
of the artistic ethos? What have been the deviations res­
ponsible for the arrest of consciousness resulting in the 
reality of fully developed imperialism as opposed to its 
utopian alternative? In a nutshell, this is the question 
we will undertake to investigate. In order to more clearly 
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develop the methodology for dealing with this question, we 
must now turn again to an examination of Marx's conceptual 
framework.
Above we have alluded to the centrality to Marx the 
idea of alienation plays. The problem of alienation we have 
tried to show is nothing less than the foremost problem of 
contemporary society. Yet we must frame our analysis in a 
manageable way. We must follow Marx in his transmutation of 
the metaphysical notion of alienation on the theoretical 
level to his more concrete and operable concept of reifica­
tion as the manifestation of alienation in the practical 
realm. The logic of the argument we must follow is a little 
complex but important nonetheless. As above we demonstrated 
the realization of the appropriation of nature in private 
property so we must now follow the realization of the 
alienation of production under the social relations of 
capitalism as they take concrete shape in the idea of com­
modity production. To quote Marx at length
Whence, then arises the enigmatical character of the 
product of labor, so soon as it assumes the form of com­
modities? Clearly from this form itself. The equality 
of all sorts of human labor is expressed objectively by 
their products all being equally values; by the measure 
of the expenditure of labor power, by the duration of 
that expenditure, takes the form of quantity of value 
of the products of labor; and finally, the mutual rela­
tions of the producers, within which the social character 
cf their labor affirms itself, takes the form of a social 
relation between products.
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply 
because in it the social character of men's labor appears 
to them as an objective character stamped upon the pro­
duct of that labor; because the relation of the producers 
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to the sum total of their own labor is presented to them 
as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but 
between the products of their labor. This is the reason 
why the products of labor become commodities, social things 
whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and im­
perceptible by the senses . . . it is a definite social 
relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the 
fantastic form of a relation between things.5
Our emphasis has been added to Marx's passage here to under­
line the importance of his insight. Here we can begin to see 
how Marx shows the way capitalist development and the concom­
itant social relations engendered militate to create and alien 
milieu, an "objective" universe which "subjectively" is inde­
pendent and autonomous. Once the level of commodity produc­
tion has been achieved, Lukacs elaborates upon the process
. . . because of this situation a man's own activity, his 
own labor becomes something objective and independent of 
him, something that controls him by virtue of an autonomy 
alien to man. There is both an objective and a subjective 
side to this phenomenon. Objectively a world of objects 
and relations between things springs into being (the world 
of commodities and their movements on the market). The 
laws governing these objects are indeed gradually discov­
ered by man, but even so they confront him as invisible 
forces that generate their own power. The individual 
can use his knowledge of these laws to his own advantage, 
but he is not able to modify the process by his own 
activity. Subjectively, where the market economy has 
been fully developed--a man's activity becomes estranged 
from himself, it turns into a commodity which, subject 
to the non-human objectivity of the natural laws of 
society, must go its own way independently of man just 
like any consumer article.°
Again we can see the room in Marx's theoretical scheme for 
dynamism in the tension between ofjective and subjective 
development of process allowing for movement in the historical 
continuuim. Perhaps following in this way we can posit a 
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testable situation relevant to the historical development 
of consciousness.
Classically (vulgarly?), Marx was concerned with 
"objective" processes in dealing with the problem of reifica­
tion. George Lukacs writes, interpreting Marx
The separation of the producer from his means of 
production, the dissolution and destruction of all 
"natural" production units, etc., and all social and 
economic conditions necessary for the emergence of modern 
capitalism tend to replace "natural" relations which ex­
hibit human relations more plainly by rationally reified 
relations.7
And yet there is a qualitative difference between the condi­
tions classical Marxist categories we are analyzing and those 
of contemporary society. The preceeding example was included, 
not to demonstrate the vulgarism of Lukacs (who should be 
regarded as one of the pathfinders in reversing that very 
trend) but to provide a reference point from which to ob­
serve the total invasion of a reified universe into the 
subjective as well as objective world.
In comparison with laissez-faire capitalism—the 
capitalism of Marx’s time, where the problematic of the 
human situation was expressed mainly in terms of economic 
exploitation and political oppression—the new type of 
capitalism contains an almost irreversible tendency to­
ward the universalization of alienation. In other words 
it tends to convert the "totality of social life and 
existence into an object of domination with the ’inten­
tion* of transforming all subjectivity and activity into 
reified objectivity.
We have mentioned the intent to analyze the works of 
Mark Twain and Jack London as perhaps representative of the 
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subjective situation during the period of •vulgar* capital­
ism in America, as historical examples. The point of using 
historical examples for analysis is to provide continuity 
into the present and theoretically to project into the 
future as well. As contemporary examples for analysis we 
have chosen the literature of Jospeh Heller and Kurt Vonne­
gut as representative of the "new type" of capitalism, the 
stage of imperialism. Thus we can begin to formulate test­
able hypotheses for our application of the dialectic. Does 
the idea of universalization of alienation find reinforcement 
through stages of capitalist development in the work of these 
four writers? Does this type of historical analysis indicate 
direction minimally in the sense of quantitative escalations 
or qualitative transformations in the historical continuuim? 
Have the changing objective situations through stages of 
development been reflected in the focus upon specific prob­
lems by the writers in question? And what have been the 
subjective reactions to these situations?
Thus we have posed the question to be—how has the 
character of alienation been shaped through periods in the 
historical process? Finally and more importantly than simply 
asking how did writers depict problematic situations objec­
tively, we want to ask: how have writers dealt with breaking 
through reified and static reality during these dynamic peri­
ods? Were writers able to percieve alternatives to unaccept­
able situations and, more importantly, were they able to 
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indicate ways to practically implement solutions? We have 
indicated one criteria by which the value and ideological 
content of art can be assessed. We have posited the 
a priori ciritcal nature of art in its function to depict 
objective reality in such a way as to make obvious contra­
dictions specific to the reality of the artist. Within our 
framework of analysis any cultural products which do not 
meet this criteria must be considered failures in that they 
comprise not art but rather simple propaganda. The writers 
we have chosen can all be said to have effected success in 
tendering criticism at least on this level. In posing our 
final question we must ask about success on another level. 
What writers were able to succeed in the sense of solving 
the problems they set out for themselves in their works? 
Have these writers dealt successfully with the problem of 
reification as we have outlined it above? If alienation is 
the foremost problem of contemporary society and the concrete 
manifestation of this phenomenon is realized through a 
reified perception of reality, then the factors responsible 
for the successful resolution of this problem would seem to 
be of paramount importance for the viability of the critical 
perspective.
People who percieve the world through this mask of re­
ification never question the exploitative and oppressive 
relationships which determine their lives, for they are 
unable to imagine that any alternative to this situation 
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is possible. Only during periods in which the reifying 
structures of institutions are disrupted--during periods 
of profound social crisis and disintegration—does a 
clear perception of the true nature of society and the 
structural relationships which characterize it become 
fully possible.9
Our attempted analysis cannot and will not be by any 
means exhaustive or encyclopedic. What will be tried will be 
a typolozation along some suggested theoretical dimensions 
using some examples from fictional American literature. By 
choosing examples from what the writer believes to be critical 
periods in American history, we may be able in this way to 
look at the relationships between this specific art form 
and reified consciousness.
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Mark Twain (.1835-1910) the first subject for our 
analysis can be understood as either a simple humorist and 
tale-spinner of the period or upon closer scruitiny can 
rather be placed in the tradition of social satirist of 
classical status. In writing of Twain's works, Philip
Foner writes
His social criticism, expressed in novels, stories, 
essays, and pamphlets, ranks with that of Milton, Swift, 
Defoe, Janius, Voltaire, Tom Paine and Bernard Shaw, both 
in terms of literary quality and their influence on public 
opinion. His humor tipped a sword's point. It cuts 
through social and political pretenses, defended and en­
riched the democratic heritage . . .
Mark Twain was our greatest social critic. As such 
he speaks to us with an immediacy that surmounts the 
barriers of time.l
Twain included in his prolific commentary extensive 
writings on corruption in politics and government, a critique 
of monopoly capitalism and the Robber Barons. He wrote exten­
sively on the questions of vulgar imperialism as they emerged 
in the Spanish-American War, the Boer War and events of the 
day in China. Twain virtually left no hypocrisy untouched by 
the biting wit of his satire.
Yet here we have a specific purpose and want to focus 
upon a particular aspect of Twain's work. We want to choose 
a specific problem and once having established an historical 
context, we want to try and decipher the ideological content 
of the artist's treatment of it. We want to examine Twain's
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work as a
characteristic product of the decade when Americans 
generally first realized they were entering the modern 
world. The Civil War had given a decided impetus to the 
mechanization of industry in this century, and the pro­
cess had gained speed in the post-Civil War decades. By 
the 1880‘s a revolutionary change began to be apparent 
to most people in the United States—not only factory 
workers and dwellers in the industrial cities, but also 
farmers, especially in the West, who were using machines 
to expand agricultural production and found themselves 
dependent on the new railway systems to send their crops 
to markets in the East and Europe.
The pace and scope of industrialization placed un­
precedented strains on American society and American 
culture. The traditional system of values, the beliefs 
about men, institutions, and the universe that had guided 
the lives of generations, were coming to seem irrelevant. 
New conceptions of value, a new ethics, a new philosophy 
had to be created. As always imaginative writers had the 
task of synthesizing fact and theory into images that 
could be understood by the public at large.2
The most obvious contradiction in social relations 
during the period in which Twain wrote, demanding to be re­
solved was the question of chattel slavery. Although this 
problem was solved de .jure by the Civil War, the question of 
the roots and moral implications of slavery was one with 
which Twain felt it imperative to deal. His most important 
contribution to the subject is found in The Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn where
The institution of chattel slavery always forms the 
background against which these boys live. It forces 
itself into the very content of consciousness, not only 
of Tom and Huck, but of all the members of the village. 
As Bernard De Voto has pointed out, the existence of 
slavery explains the role that superstition plays in the 
minds of Tom and Huck. Here Mark Twain made a neat social 
comment. He told us, in effect, that if we preserve the
Uo.
institution of slavery it will permeate our entire 
culture and become a formidible barrier to progress. 
Just as slavery produces meanness and brutality, so does 
it perpetuate magic. Briefly, the backwardness of the 
slaves, treated as property rather than human beings, 
will blunt the moral and intellectual development of the 
masters.3
The dilemma of the ofjective facts of chattie slavery 
and the resulting de-humanized property relationship between 
man and man is the central problem of Huck Finn as a work 
of art.
One of the moving themes of the story is Huck’s un­
easiness over the fact that by accident he is helping a 
"nigger” to run away. He has his own code of morality, 
where property is concerned; he doesn't wish to be a 
thief. The refinements of honesty, so to speak, he had 
learned from his father, who always said it was wrong to 
take what was another man’s, unless you had the intention 
of paying it back sometime. When he and Jim found them­
selves obliged to rob orchards and gardens in order to 
maintain life, they quieted their conscience by making it 
a rule never to steal all they could. Crap-apples, for 
instance, they always left untouched. But when it came 
to stealing niggers! On the other hand, when the thought 
of Jim’s kindness to him, of the negro’s terror of the 
plantation from which he could never hope to return to 
his wife and children, Huckleberry was in a tangle. He 
did go so far as to write to Miss Watson and tell her 
where Jim could be found, but he couldn’t bring himself 
to post the letter. "I was in a tight place. I took it 
up and held it in my hand. I was a-trembling, because 
I’d got to decide, forever, between two things, and I 
knowed it. I studies a minute, sort of holding my breath, 
and then says to myself:"All right, then, I’ll go to hell", and tore it up."^
Thus Twain’s book must be said to have succeeded at 
least in one sense. In creating real, human characters he 
was able to show the moral consequences of the objective 
facts for humans as property. This contradiction in the
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capitalist order at that time was blatant and yet it was 
revolutionary to question its legitimacy, so overwhelming 
was its practical power. Lionel Trilling writes
Huckleberry Finn is indeed a subversive book—no one who 
reads thoughtfully the dialectic of Huck's great moral 
crisis will ever again be wholly able to accept without 
some question and some irony the assumptions of the 
respectable morality by which he lives, nor will ever 
again be certain that what he considers the clear dictates 
of moral reason are not merely the engrained customary 
beliefs of his time and place.5
The everyday depiction of life, the realism of Twain’s charac­
ters makes his treatment of the moral relativity of the time 
more powerful even than other more celebrated polemics di­
rected specifically against slavery. Huckleberry Finn 
provides us with
the one elaborate picture we have of the negro slave 
before the war, and in a community in which owner and 
slave alike take slavery very much for granted. Mrs. 
Stowe’s famous book is full of correct observations; 
she gives us no doubt a fair account of slavery at its 
happiest—along with other reports vzhich some Southeners 
will always think exaggerated. But Uncle Tom’s Cabin 
remains a discussion of slavery as an issue of justice; 
the problem colors every sentence in the book. There 
must have been thousands of families in which the issue 
never suggested itself. That is the version of slavery 
which Mark Twain has given us—the picture of good Chris­
tian homes in which the slaves were as natural an incident 
as any other human relation. Even as propaganda, if Huck­
leberry Finn had been written early enough to serve that 
purpose, it would have been more subtly convincing than 
Mrs. Stowe’s book, for the dramatic method, without preaching of any kind, here stirs the emotions deeply.6
Arbitrarily deciding to have demonstrated Twain’s 
grasp of the historical situation, the objective circum­
stances of the exploitation and de-humanization of slavery 
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we must now turn to the question of how the historical pro­
cess emerges from his works. Having thoroughly exposed the 
problem of consciousness posed by the objective situation 
standing in utterly hypocritical relation to his definition 
of morality, we must investigate the nature of the moral 
imperatives central to Twain’s critique, his practical im­
plementation of his moral principles. Following our theme 
into Twain’s greal moral allegory, Life on the Mississippi, 
we find the symbolic treatment of his position in his use of 
the river as the fountain and sustainer of idealism.
The Civil War and the development of the rail­
roads ended the days when the river was the central 
artery of the nation. No contrast could be more moving 
than that between the hot, turbulent energy of the river 
life in the first part of Life on the Mississippi and 
the melancholy reminiscence of the second part. And the 
war that brought the end of the rich Mississippi days also 
marked a change in the quality of life in America which, 
to many men, consisted of a deterioration of moral values.?
Here we come to the principle contradiction which 
Mark Twain was never able to satisfactorily resolve and 
which lay at the basis of the profound pessimism and cynicism 
he came to embrace toward the end of his life. His concep­
tion of the moral reservoir symbolized in the river was some­
thing which on the one hand stood apart, eternal and uncorrupt- 
able, from material society. And yet he came to see that this 
moral reservoir itself, when divorced from the practical realm 
came to impotence in competition with the power of material 
production and development to create a morality, based on 
^3-
exploitation and hypocrisy, more suited to the purposes of 
capitalist economy, Roger Saloman, in his excellent analysis 
of the question in his book Mark Tv/ain and the Image of His­
tory, writes perceptively.
In Life on the Mississippi, as we have already ob- 
observed, two very different themes are developed at some 
length; on the one hand, the progress of society on the 
banks of the river from feudalism to democracy and indus­
trialism; on the other, the values of life on the river 
itself—freedom, independence, essential innocence, 
escape from society and ultimately escape from the tyr­
anny of time and history.°
In this light we can see the ideological consequences 
for progress begin to take systematic form through Twain's 
works. Was Huckleberry Finn's decision to violate the moral­
ity of chattel slavery property rights made in history or 
outside of it? Was Twain able to, in his work, to effectively 
counter the affronts to his morality made by the enormity of 
industrialization?
. . . in Huckleberry Finn as in Life on the Mississippi 
time stops at the v/aters edge. Describing his trip down 
the great river by steamboat in 1882, Twain wrote that on 
the Mississippi "the day goes, the night comes, and again 
the day—and still the same night after night after night 
and day after day—majestic, unchanging sameness of seren­
ity, repose, tranquility, lethargy, vagrancy—symbol of 
eternity, realization of heaven pictured by priest and 
prophet.• . . . The motion of a raft . . . is gentle,
and gliding, and smooth, and noisless; it calms down all 
feverish activities, it soothes to sleep all nervous 
hurry and impatience; under its restful influence all the 
trouble and vexations and sorrows that harass the mind 
vanish away, and existence becomes a dream, a charm, a 
deep and tranquil ecstacy." Here again the images of 
sleep and motion over water coalesce to become a symbol 
of peace, security, stasis, but here in addition, they are 
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welcomed as a form of mythical release that annuls 
the agony of consciousness.9
Twain proves up to the task of setting up the question in 
history for our case here, but fails in the task of solving 
it without a hero who can escape to a mythological region 
outside time and history. As we stated above, this failure 
cannot detract from Twain*s ability to tender powerful criti­
cism of society, but by the same token his characterization 
of the emerging social order as overwhelming, static and 
immutable, led him to reject the image of man as an actor 
in history, as being capable of actively participating in 
and shaping the progress of mankind.
Myths, necessarily, are merely concrete representations 
of the ineffable. Only in the image of the flowing 
river and the boy who communes with it did Twain con­
vincingly succeed in describing a mode of being apart 
from the tyranny of history.1°
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Jack London (1876-1916) is the next writer-critic we 
wish to consider. Although a contemporary, objectively, of 
Mark Twain, London represents a subjectively different 
generation in his concern with problems and his analysis of 
them. There were two main points in the facts of existence 
with which London concerned himself. The first was the con­
dition of the working class being created by the industrial­
ization taking place in America at this time. The second 
point was the inevitability and consequences of class 
struggle he saw as a necessary part of this development.
The end of the nineteenth century found the nation 
in a state of great social and political unrest. It 
found expression in the rise of the labor movement, 
furious battles between labor and capital, and the 
political conflict between farmers, workers and small 
business men on the one hand and the powerful monopolies 
on the other. Yet throughout this turbulent period there 
was a curious dicotomy between literature and life. Any­
one dependent upon American letters to guide him would 
have obtained the most confused and inaccurate conception 
of the life led by more than sixty millions of Americans 
and of the major problems confronting them. He would 
find that the American people were concerned solely with 
romantic love sometimes enacted in remote times by men 
and women in costumes who addressed each other as "thee" 
and "thou", or in imagined principalities of Europe like 
Zenda or Graustark where gilt-uniformed officers wooed 
beautiful heroines on marble terraces. If the romance 
was set in contemporary America it was all in the frag­
rance of new-movzn hay or of magnolias surrounding 
white-columned verandas. The teeming life of the indus­
trial city produced the formula of the poor boy who 
married the boss's daughter and was taken into the firm. 
Of the grinding poverty of the workers, of wretched hou- 
ing, low wages, long hours and unsanitary working condi­
tions, of child labor, of the ruthless industrial and 
financial tycoons the literature of the day said little.1 
4?.
London, as was Twain, was a prolific writer and wrote into his 
work a particular point of view which was directed at bringing 
to light the gross injustices mentioned above. London used a 
vividly realistic style to describe the excesses of capitalist 
development in the slums generated by industrialization in 
England. In his People of the Abyss his famous description of 
the desperation and degradation of unemployed slum dwellers.
From the slimy, spittle-drenched sidewalk, they were 
picking up bits of orange peel, apple skin and grape stems, 
they were eating them. The pits of green gage plums they 
carcked between their teeth for the kernels inside. They 
pciked up stray crumbs of bread the size of peas, apple 
cores so black and dirty one would not take them to be 
apple cores, and these things these two men took into their 
mouths, and chewed them, and swallowed them; and this, be­
tween six and seven o’clock in the evening of August 20, 
year of our Lord 1902, in the heart of the greatest, wealth­
iest, and most powerful empire the world has ever seen.2
London utilized his talent for detail and realism to bring into 
focus the objective situation that the consolidation of monoply 
capitalism spawned as a social consequent. As a result of his 
experience with the working class and as a product of his intel­
lectual development, London was able to apply his method to 
provide a concrete dimension to his systematic indictment of 
the capitalist development. Maxwell Geismar encapsulates 
London’s collection of essays entitled War of the Classes
In the moral underworld that was described in the pages 
of War of the Classes, the strike and the boycott, the 
blacklist and the lock out, led the way only to suborned 
judges and armies of private militias; and these in turn 
were the support of an industrial system whose primary 
condition of existence was that there should be less 
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work than there were men to do the work. Here indeed 
the tramp had almost become a typical product and uni­
versal figure of American society. From its upper 
reaches of unlimited power—the titians emerging from 
the tooth and nail struggle of capitalism—to the lowest 
depth of human misery and degradation, this was a universe 
of scabs. To the melodrama of Marxist polemics, London 
had added undertones of the Darwinian jungle and some­
thing of his own nightmarish world of fantasy. . . . 
Moreover, whenever he wrote and spoke, London was not 
adverse to stirring up the latent fear of class war 
directly after the Populist uprisings and Bryan’s 
campaigns; or of that "class separation that '. . . hints 
of anarchy." The class struggle was intrinsically a part 
of the industrial scene of the 1900’s, he said, whatever 
the optimistic American’s thought or said to conceal the 
fact. "It is no longer a question whether or not there 
is a class struggle. The question now is what will be the 
outcome of the class struggle."3
Or in another article
. . .London sets out to destroy one of the cherished 
myths of American capitalism; that there is no class 
struggle in American society. The believers in the 
myth are like ostriches with their heads in the sand; 
because they cannot see the class struggle, they refuse 
to recognize that it exists. He points out that the 
disappearance of the frontier forced the superior workers, 
who usually rose out of their class, to remain in the 
the working class. So they begin to play a leading role 
in the organization of labor, and soon these "ambitious 
young men, denied the opportunity to rise from the work­
ing class, preach revolt to the wroking class." The 
existence of trade unions, London argues is irrefutable 
proof of the presence of the class struggle. Capital 
wants more profit and labor wants higher wages, and no 
amount of pretty speechifying about the need for harmony 
between these two classes can blunt the basic struggle that exists between them.^
London believed absolutely in the inevitability of 
class struggle and class warfare. His analysis of capitalism 
from the standpoint of a revolutionary was thoroughgoing and 
incisive. His reliance upon Marx and Darwin for a theoretical 
^9-
base combined with his penchant for alarming invective to 
culminate in his most important contribution to the literature 
of revolution, written in 190?
. . . The Iron Heel, in the same year, was a key work— 
perhaps a classic work—of American radicalism.
The story was told through a diary, discovered 
centuries after the collapse of capitalism in the United 
States and the rise of an implacable oligarchy. As a 
novel, The Iron Heel had obvious faults. It was closer 
to a utopia of horrors, among the first of a new line of 
such works as Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World or George 
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, which came to replace 
the social idylls of the last century.5
The Iron Heel incorporates London’s emphasis on class 
struggle and places heavy emphasis upon the possibility that 
in the Darwinistic fight for survival, the capitalist class 
would prove more of a formidable adversary than most social­
ists and revolutionaries imagined. Here the underestimation 
of the fortitude of capitalists to maintain their positions 
to dominate society is prophesied as resulting in the defeat 
of the working class, initially. The triumph of socialism is
projected to reign after a protracted underground war of 
attrition between workers and capitalists. The lesson London 
is preaching is that socialist leaders must recognize the 
futility of a "democratic'' overthrow of capitalism and must 
prepare for the onset of class war, based on a Marxist 
analysis of history. He believed that the capitalist would 
never willingly relinquish power. In this work
It was the capitalist class not the workers, London 
insisted, who would use violence; in their attempt to 
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prevent the democratic will of the people from being 
exercised they would institute a reign of terror to 
destroy the movements that threatened their power. The 
years have proved Jack London's picture in The Iron Heel 
to be tragically correct. We have but to substitute the 
work "fascism" for "oligarchy" and The Iron Heel becomes 
a living picture of what actually happened in the past 
two decades. It is true that London did not forsee the 
brutal forms which fascism would take in our time. Yet 
despite many differences between what happened in Germany, 
Italy and Spain and what is pictured in this book, it is 
probably the most amazingly prophetic work of the twen­tieth century.6
London's analysis did provide clear and incisive 
analysis of the American economic and political system and 
did recognize that a thoroughgoing revolution was the sol­
ution to the problem. But we again encounter a problematic 
situation in his answer. London's embrace of social Darwin­
ism in his estimate of the class struggle in American 
society and its direction led him to the position that:
Every social and industrial violence, every outrage 
caused by competition, was beatified with an aura of 
destined good in the philosophy of Social Darwinism. 
This put the humanitarianism and idealism under a fright­
ful strain. The blessed prospect of the perfect society 
springing from child labor called for specially tinted 
lenses.
For many, a central figure in the social struggle 
came to be the "superman". In his ruthless quest for 
power this giant among men would help along the selection 
of the fittest by crushing the weak and helpless. The 
superman so appealed to Spencerian thinking that surely 
he would have been invented by someone else if the German 
philosopher Nietzsche had not done so. In fact the term 
"superman" by itself had the power to inflame the imagina­
tion of many who had never read Thus Spake Zorathustra, 
and the rugged individualist superman that emerged in the 
popular literature—often ferocious blond Vikings--bore 
small resemblance to the type of genius Nietzsche des­
cribed.
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At the same time the role of unbridled individualism 
in the evolution of society was being challenged by the 
philosophy of socialism. In The Communist Manifesto 
Karl Marx had called upon the workingmen of the world—the 
supposedly weak and helpless victims of natural select- 
ion--to unite and overthrow their exploiters and oppress­
ors, the industrialist ruling class. According to the 
followers of Marx, not the superman individualist but 
the socialist community of workers must be the instru­
ment of evolutionary progress.?
Throughout London’s novels in the character of
Wold Larsen in The Sea Wolf, Martin Eden and Ernest Everhard 
in The Iron Heel, we find the principle actors are archetyp­
ical blond beasts—supermen. And this tendency in London’s 
writings forms the basic ambiguity in his creations. Philip 
Foner comments upon this process.
All works on the Nietzschean world-conqueror, the 
strong and ruthless supermen, the blond beasts who were 
destined to be the rulers and emperors over all other 
men most interested Jack London. He read and discussed 
several of the books by archpriest of the cult of the 
superman, Thus Spake Zarathustra, The Will to Power, 
Genology of Morals, The Case of Wagner, The Antichrist, 
and later wrote a preface for Leo Berg’s The Superman. 
George Bernard Shaw’s "philosopher-athlete" in Man and 
Superman appealed to Jack immensely.
The fact that so much of the Nietzschean philosophy, 
emphasizing as it did an aristocracy of supermen who 
would dominate the ordinary run of human beings, and 
flaunting its destestation of socialism and trade union­
ism, went counter to his socialist convictions did not 
bother Jack London. He took those aspects of Nietzsche 
which appealed to him and which appealed to him and 
which he could, in his own fashion, reconcile with Marx­
ism. After all, why could not the supermen work to 
bring about a system under which the average men would be benefited?’*”
London’s acceptance of this elitist point of view 
has been traced in other contexts to generalize into a
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doctrine of supremacy of white races to those of color.
Thus it seems in analyzing the work of Jack London we find 
that his analysis and criticism of the consolidation of 
American capitalism as an artistic problem is handled in a 
highly successful way. Yet once subject to the logic of 
his own expose and his wariness of the power of the ruling 
class to maintain itself, London was forced to abandon his 
historical approach and reach, again, outside of history in 
to the mythological realm of the superman for the location 
of (to him) a hope for resolution to his problem.
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IV.
C. JOSEPH HELLER
In treating Heller's work, Catch-22, we make an 
historical shift in the theoretical continuuim we have hypo­
thesized. As opposed to the "objective*' priorities covered 
by the proceeding writers, as concomitant with embryonic, 
"vulgar" capitalism; Heller and Vonnegut share artistic 
affinity for the "subjective" problems characteristic of the 
stabilized, more totally developed imperialist period in 
capitalist development. As we move into the contemporary 
example we find that
. . . Heller's novel does operate within an established 
literary tradition. Catch-22 is finally a radical protest 
novel. Like The Grapes of Wrath and An American Tragedy, 
its protest is directed from the left toward the prevail­
ing centers of power in America. But whereas Steinbeck 
and Dreiser aimed their polemics at the trust and the ty­
coon, Heller's target shifted. As C. Wright Mills points 
out, the new images of power in modern mass society are 
the interlocking bureauracies of industry, the military, 
and the political administration. Heller apparently feels 
that the power shift must be countered with new patterns 
of protest.^
These institutional patterns are products of the 
capitalist nature of society in the novel, Carl Oglesby in 
his excellent review of Catch-22
. . . can think of no important American novel whose 
primary conflict is more deeply class-structured than 
Catch-22. Heller could hardly have made things clearer; 
the Second World War, at one level the clash of rival 
nationalisms, of vertically unified class societies, at 
another and apparently more important level was an 
intra-societal clash of rival classes—the men against 
the officers, the young against the old, the people 
against the ruling establishment, neither one sharing or 
even recognizing the other's aim, the one aiming 
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consciously to extend and consolidate its power, the 
other aiming fitfully and in semi-darkness to break free 
of the fold and to redefine social values in its own 
terms.
In Heller’s writing we can begin to discern the movement of 
emphasis of concern with alienation begin to shift into the 
psychological, "subjective”, dimension. For one of the 
central themes of his novel deals with the specious logic 
of the military-bureaucratic hierarchy and its invasion of 
rationality and redefinition of it with absurdity. The most 
obvious example of this is the Catch-22 itself. The irration­
al is given legitimacy
There was only one catch and that was Catch 22, 
which specified that a concern for one’s safety in the 
face of dangers that were real and immediate was the 
process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be 
grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he 
did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly 
more missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions 
and sane if he didn’t, but if he was sane he had to fly 
them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn’t have to; 
but if he didn’t want to he was sane and had.to.2
The insanity of the modern institutional structure, mediated 
through such rules leads to encounters with absurdity and 
pathology on the part of his actors. However Heller
. . . refuses to accept absurdity as an onotological 
fact. Rather, he views it as a by-product of the bureau- 
racies in control of modern mass society. In Catch-22 
the military serves as a metaphor for bureaucratic 
power in general. As the novel develops, this power 
spreads until it seems to touch all aspects of human life. 
Yossarian, the novel’s protagonist, is temporarily safe 
from the destructive influence of the military, for ex­
ample, when he is on leave in Rome or in the hospital. 
Eventually, however, these retreats are either destroyed 
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or transformed by the cancer-like spread of bureaucratic 
power. MP's drive the prostitutes from the Rome brothel, 
depriving Yossarian of the temporary solace of sex.1*
Heller has posed a very significant moral dilemma in 
attempting to confront the rising power of the absurd milieux 
he percieves to be contemporary reality. This theatre re­
volves around the character of Colonel Cathcart. Cathcart 
as the agent of the dominant class through which institution­
al-bureaucratic imperatives operate upon mere men is obvious.
Of a very bad lot, Cathcart is the worst. He con- 
bines all the standard virtues of his class: ruthless­
ness, stupidity, avarice, cowardice and so on; Heller 
persuades us that Cathcart will indeed make general one 
day—five star, no doubt. But besides this, Cathcart is 
a centrally placed actor, someone whose decisions di­
rectly hit the lives of the men under his command. It 
is Cathcart who keeps raising the number of missions the 
men must fly, Cathcart who gleefully anticipates casual­
ties among his men on grounds that this will be a proof 
to the higher-ups of his own greater dedication and brav­
ery, Cathcart who consciouly punishes fliers by volun­
teering them for exceptionally dangerous missions, Cath­
cart who demands the pointless bombing of an undefended 
and perhaps friendly mountain village. He is a ridicu­
lous person, but also consequential—a monstrous combin­
ation. Heller quite metholologically refuses us the 
opportunity of being for one moment mistaken about this 
Cathcart. He is a criminal all around, everyone*s execu­
tioner: a clear and present danger.5
Following Carl Oglesby*s provocative analysis of Catch-22 
we must in turn ask the question; ’’why is Cathcart not 
assinated?” If the absurdity Heller is describing is a 
product of historical development, then why cannot this 
dilemma be resolved by real men acting to bring the ridiculous 
back under moral and rational sanctions?
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The world of Catch-22, that is, is one in which the 
possibility of political, historical rebellion has 
already been foreclosed. Only try to imagine what hap­
pens to the psychological ambience of the book, its tone 
and its spirit, if Yossarian—a bombardier after all who 
kills people every day—should actually bring off the 
assination of a war criminal, Cathcart. We have been 
able to smile with derision at this immune and safe­
guarded Cathcart who kills and kills with impunity. As 
soon, however, as he is killed, that superior smile 
seems no longer possible. Everything becomes suddenly 
very serious; almost automatically, a search for the mode 
of his assassin’s tragic downfall shoots immediately into 
the book. Yossarian who makes his rebellion political 
and real—revolutionary—is a Yossarian who can no longer 
be focused by means of the underlying assumption of the 
novel. ®
The underlying assumptions of the novel are, simplis- 
tically, the inevitability of the subserviance of man to an 
irrationally antagonistic existence mediated through absurd­
ity on the individual level. Heller has depicted a problem­
atic situation generated by men through history and yet 
again sought to disengage from the process in answering his 
question. Again the failure to confront history results in 
the failure of the work as art. Rather than writing a novel 
which resolves/revolutionizes
. . . Heller has not written this novel. At the last 
minute, he in fact kills the dilemma which he had seemed 
to pose by introducing a third term. If historical 
revolution is impossible, he says, private rebellion is 
not. A rebellion which amounts only to an escape is 
produced at the very moment the last dice are being 
rolled. It turns out to be the reverse side of the 
twenty-second catch, or perhaps it is catch-23: to an 
unthinkable revolution and an unendurable regime, Heller 
suddenly adds the alternative of desertion. If men can­
not remake their social destinies by acting together in 
history, then each man, it seems, can avoid social destiny 
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altogether by escaping history—by escaping politics, by 
taking asylum in this nonaligned Sweden which Yossarian 
is headed for at the unconvincingly festive and to my 
mind disasterous close of the novel. Nonaligned: that 
is, a country without politics, presumable therefore 
without Colonel Cathcarts, a country in which social 
history is no longer individually contingent.7
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In taking the liberty of using an analytical division 
of labor, if our analysis of Heller focused upon the theo­
retical dimension of contemporary literature, then our 
analysis of the writing of Vonnegut should center upon the 
methodological content. This is not to say, of course, that 
Vonnegut’s writings do not exhibit analagous theoretical 
tendencies to reject historical reality as a basis for 
rationality. Vonnegut's use of the medium of science 
fiction to provide a means of historical escape is obvious.
There is another aspect of the science fiction, also 
pervasive in The Sirens of Titan, which calls attention 
to itself in Slaughterhouse-Five. That is the element 
of evasion or escape. For while the science fiction 
stresses the grim aspects of existence—inevitability, 
meaninglessness, alienation and isolation, the absurd— 
it remains itself an escape into imagination and fancy. 
This ambivalence of science fiction contributes to the 
mixed tone common in Vonnegut. . . . Billy's space 
journey extends the extential terms of his earthly 
journey, it also contains some of the happiest, most 
comforting moments of his life. The Tralfmadorians 
themselves seem kind, and apparently do their best to 
treat Billy with understanding. He feels as happy there 
as on earth, his little zoo world seems cozy, and his 
relationship with Montana Wildhack is a loving one. In 
fact it looks almost like an erotic dream come true 
combined with ideal matrimonial harmony, the sweet in­
nocence of Adam and Eve recreated in the snug safety of 
a geodesic Eden. . . .
. . . If in these respects the time and space travel 
looks like wish-fulfillment or escape from reality, that 
is entirely appropriate. We must surely wonder, like his 
daughter and others in the novel, if all Billy's talk of 
Tralfmadore and time travel is not madness.
This is to say that Vonnegut falls into the same trap in his 
writing as have the other cases we have analyzed. Again while
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remaining true to the a priori critical nature of artistic 
endeavors to critique established reality, his attempt at 
an historical answer flies in the face of his historical 
problem. We do not mean science fiction to be escapist in 
the sense of unable to depict problems, on the contrary
, Actually science fiction is primarily social criti­
cism, usually veiled in the remoteness of time and alien 
location. Good science fiction communicates most effect­
ively by projecting current problems to their logical 
future conclusions. Nor is science fiction social parody 
(except when it parodies itself, as in the Sirens of 
Titan) because parody is normally an inversion or gro­
tesque variation of things which exist now in the world. 
Science fiction, however is an extension of current 
trends to logical and frequently horrible conclusions, 
and an understanding of science fiction's tendency to 
extend current social phenomena into the future is im­
portant, even critical, to a recoginition of the nature 
of current science fiction.2
One of the main literary devices (methodologies) employed by
Vonnegut is a representation of reality in which sequential 
history and causal relationships are dismembered and given 
random, coincidental character. This method, for instance, 
provides the basic structure for the novel Cat's Cradle 
which is a
. . . novel which deals with the end of the universe as 
the results of a long and complicated train of events. 
The Vonnegut world in this novel is not so very different 
from our ov/n. He is dealing with one of the constant 
themes of science fiction, the cataclysmic ending of the 
universe through the action of man. But the universe 
that is destroyed is one which corresponds with consider­
able sociological, religious, and logical precision to 
the universe which exists in reality for most of mankind. 
It is this sense of immediate reality which makes Cat's 
Cradle the terrifying, if amusing book that it is. Von­
negut uses here an objective, correlative, scientific 
world familiar to his readers, to communicate the genuine 
but unfamiliar absurdity of the universe.3
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Vonnegut’s reality is one in which historical progress and 
value laden moral questions are given disturbing treatment.
One does not read far in Vonnegut, however, without 
discovering that despite the naturalness of the narrator’s 
voice, he is not in the natural world. He is instead in 
a world of futuristic fantasy, a world where beings like 
Bokonists and Tralfmadorians are as natural as grass 
and trees. Vonnegut’s narrator lacks the frenzy of Hel­
ler’s in Catch-22, or the weirdness of Barth’s in Giles 
Goat-Boy, and yet the world he evokes is as fantastic as 
anything is those books. Indeed it is more fantastic; 
it is harder to find real-life parallels to Tralfmadore 
than to Heller’s World War II or Barth's cold war campus. 
At the same time, Vonnegut’s world is more "real” than 
these others. The naturalness of the narrator’s voice 
gives us this feeling, but so do many details of the set- 
ing. The names of Castro, Dresden, Hitler, and Stalin 
occur in Cat’s Cradle and Slaughterhouse-Five, for ex­
ample; but these real events and people are present in 
Catch-22 and Giles Goat-Boy only as they are made meta­
phorical or allegorical.
In Catch-22 the world of the Second War is captured 
in one microcosm, the United States Air Force. In 
Giles Goat-Boy the post-war world is allegorized, its 
main personages and events finding their parallels in 
the smaller world of the university campus. Here every­
thing fantastic has its real-life or earthly counterpart. 
But in books like Vonnegut's Sirens of Titian, Cat’s 
Cradle, and Slaughterhouse-Five there is a different 
alignment of fantasy and reality. The two are portrayed 
side by side as if both are equally fantastic and 
equally real— Christianity and Bokonism, Tralfmadore 
and Dresden, the Wall Street Journal and the Beatrice 
Rumfoord Galactic Cookbook. Vonnegut’s deadpan narrator 
is related to deadpan tail-tale narrators of all sorts 
from Swift’s Gulliver to Twain's Jim Baker; but in 
Vonnegut's case the reader's pleasure is derived not 
only from the continued tension between tone and material 
(as in Swift and Twain) but, still more importantly, from 
the tension between two kinds of material, one fantastic 
and the other real.^
The methodology employed by Vonnegut to effect this dis­
solution of the historical continuum and firmament of the 
idea of causality is interesting. His treatment of the 
63.
non-sequential nature of time coupled with absolute exis­
tential equality of phenomena and events is important to 
this process. The correlation of unrelated fantastic and 
realistic material in conjunction with a confused concept of 
qualitative and quantitative moral indifferentiation adds 
further to this tendency.
The escape generated by Vonnegut in his writings is 
the culmination, so to speak, of the process we have been 
observing in the cases examined above. The various distor­
tions of history as the writers focus upon problems moves 
across the objective-subjective continuum become more extreme. 
The divorce of morality from material consequences results in 
forms of idealistic resolutions to moral problems which if we 
take Vonnegut as the arrival point can be seen as nothing 
short of fantastic. To illustrate this final point succinctly
Finally for Vonnegut there is no meaning or purpose 
in history. God is not interested. Deo volante becomes, 
in Slaughterhouse-Five, "if the accident will". There is 
no such thing as Progress, or Providence, or Manifest 
Destiny, Vonnegut’s own myths of history is given best 
in a vision which Billy Pilgrim has, in the fourth chapter 
of Slaughterhouse-Five, of a war movie run backward. 
American planes, full of holes, corpses, and wounded 
bodies, take off backward from England; over France, 
German fighters heal their enemies and raise the dead by 
sucking bullets and schrapnel from them; over Germany, 
the bombers in turn heal their enemies by sucking up 
bombs and drying up flames; the bombs are shipped back­
ward to America, where factories work day and night to 
dismantle them ("touchingly, it was mainly women who did 
this work"); their elements are shipped to specialists 
who hide them cleverly in the ground, in remote areas, so 
they can "never hurt anybody again.” And then, in Billy's 
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vision, the American airmen become innocent adolescents, 
Hitler becomes a baby, and all humanity conspires to 
produce a perfect couple in Paradise. History, in this 
vision is sin; and the fall of man for Vonnegut is a 
fall from timelessness into history. .. .5
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In attempting to recapitulate the thematic trends 
which run through our examples, we want to observe several 
points. Our analyses have not been intended to be book re­
views and have not exhausted the possibility of utilization 
of these authors as sources of data for research. A specific 
intent and bias has been utilized to glean for our purposes 
ideas and generalizations relevant to our hypostheses.
Vie have covered the two ends of the historical con- 
tinuuim of the development of capitalism in the United States 
with our examples from literature. While we cannot support 
the simple notion of smooth, quantum continuity over history 
of this development*, we believe that the case has been made 
that within the maturing process, there has been a qualita­
tive shift in emphasis in the character of ideological content 
accompanying this evolution.
Two main generalizations are intended to be drawn 
from this analytical section of the thesis. First, that we 
are indeed witnessing the invasion from the long occupied 
’objective* levels of society by capitalism into the 'sub­
jective* realm of rationality. As capitalism has realized 
itself in imperialism, a process has been under way in which 
the consolidation of the economic and political bases of 
capitalist organization have begun to ultimately determine 
the psychological content of reality. By this line of 
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thought we mean to say that as the overt, grossly exploita­
tive characteristics of capitalism were in some ways buffered, 
and mitigated as development into the imperialist stage of 
history occurred; romanticists such as Twain and revolution­
aries such as London had the bases of their critique somewhat 
co-opted. The ability of the system to meet material needs 
allowed time for consolidation and created the condition for 
the maturation into imperialism and the shift in emphasis to 
the subjective dimension. Heller and Vonnegut as represen­
tatives of the more mature imperatives of imperialism deal 
with these more esoteric contradictions concerning psycho­
pathology, absurdity and intellectual alienation in their 
works. Our point then, is that there has been a fulfillment 
or realization; i.e., a completion, of alienation moving 
along an objective-subjective continuuim concurrent with the 
development of total imperialism in the United States.
The second point we want to render concerns the nature 
of alienated art as products which are influenced by the pro­
cess of reification. We have shown, at least for our own 
examples, that art is on the one hand, a priori critical in 
nature. We mean to say that art is a transcendent enterprise 
and that by virtue of its representation of the exant reality 
as imperfect and less than utopian, it is in a sense revolu­
tionary, However, once we proceed from this intrinsic, 
intuitive feature of art and begin to examine it an an 
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ideological phenomenon, the impact of the work contains 
another variable. This feature, we believe, in tying this 
section of analysis into our previous chapters, is the basic 
metaphysical character put forth by the author. We have 
noted the utilization of history by the writers to frame 
their respective artistic problems. We have seen these 
contradictions, once elucidated, confounded and then, under 
the sponsorship of the writers in question, denied their 
origin.
We have shown how, through the utilization of a 
Marxist analysis, that what have proven ultimately to be 
moral problems through history have been given the character 
of existential, timeless, irresolvable dilemmas. These 
problems of conscience are Marxist problems in that they are 
human problems and in that Marxism is fundamentally and 
foremost a humanist philosophical and metaphysical stance. 
The problem of alienated art is a product of the divorce of 
theory from practice on all levels; a product of ideals arti­
culated but not acted upon. The result of such alienated 
art is, quoting at length from Oglesby again, an artist who 
tries
. . . to buy time for himself and his culture, snarled 
with lunacy and injustice as it is, by wrapping up 
everything in a tissue of cynicism and privileged im­
potence. History being insuffrable but unchangeable, he 
says the good man is therefore morally reprieved from the 
awful sentence of having to change it. In the company of 
Camus’ solitary rebel, he need only desert.
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What Heller finally offers us super-sensitive 
Westerners is a contemporary world in which we may ignore 
what threatens us by its example, what challenges us to 
change our lives. A world, that is, in which there is no 
Fanny Lou Hamer, no Schwerner, Chaney or Goodman, no 
Castro or Guevara or Nguyen Huu Tho; a world without 
fundamental tension, one which is not destined for signi­
ficant transformation, a world in which the summons to 
partisianship has been muffled if not ridiculed by a 
nihilism which has recently discovered gaiety, a despair 
which has learned how to frolic in the ruins of a certain 
hope.
Maybe this was a remotely defensible position in that 
decade before the First World War when another solitary 
rebel deserted another homeland ‘to forge*, as he put it 
in a tone now forbidden *in the smithy of my soul the un­
created conscience of my race*. But several wars and 
revolutions have changed the situation. The conscience 
exists, standing before us now asking not to be created 
or perfected but to be chosen and defended, in need of 
champions not exiles. Any fiction which refuses that 
request is henceforth a collaborationist fiction, a fic­
tion that tells the horrible lie that Charmichael and 
Bravo and Montes do not exist. It will require indeed 
a post-realistic fiction to tell this lie, a fiction 
which suddenly wants to toy with the notion that after 
reality there might still be something left. There will 
not be. There will only be men who can catch an eternally 
difficult reality and those who cannot. Those who cannot 
will continue to conceal their desertion beneath an his­
torical sadness endlessly more intricate in design and in 
decoration even lovely; we shall continue to hear the 
sighs of an expiring culture whose self-confidence is 
being permanently broken. And those, on the other hand, 
who will have the courage to see what is there in the 
world and to see moreover what that world needs to be­
come—these people, putting their own comfort last and 
labouring to acquire skills which come far from naturally 
to the modern Westerner, will concentrate all their power 
on that moment when the good man in hell, acting in acute 
foreknowledge of probable defeat, nevertheless acts—the 
true existentialist who chooses his history, who chooses 
his situation, and who chooses to change it; who declines 
exile and desertion, who declines to be defeated by a 
despair which he nevertheless refuses to reject. Such 
people will have no interest in a fiction of post-realism. 
They will decide and again decide to live as fully as they 
can in that eternal home before the eternal revolution 
which is eternally the moment of a man's communion with 
his brothers.1
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In effect we must conceed that by rejecting history using a 
variety of theoretical distortions, that this trend exhibited 
by the authors represents the ability of capitalism to main­
tain an ideological continuity in assigning to history its 
ability to sustain itself.
A third line of questions which is beyond the method­
ological scope developed here suggested for further inquiry 
nonetheless. This would be an investigation into the possibil­
ity of subjective conditions as we have suggested a definition 
as adequately contradictory for the formation of a revolution­
ary class consciousness. If subjective conditions are seen as 
the logical extensions of objective conditions and a historical 
society rather than some sort of idealism; then the possibili­
ties seem worthwhile examining. For instance, if we were to 
apply Maslow*s heirarchy of needs to our situation we could 
call the early period of capitalist development one in which 
contradictions were more obviously contradictory to physical 
maintainance and safety needs. Our contemporary examples 
would seem to correspond more to needs for community and 
self-actualization. Certainly this is not to say that possi­
bilities for self-actualization did not exist before modern 
society, rather that the material bases for the liberation of 
men into higher order satisfaction has never before been 
potentially so universal. Could contradictions of this nature 
prove catalytic in breaking through reified history? While 
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our material does seem to indicate some support for this 
position, it is by no means conclusive. However a specific 
methodology could be developed to shed light on this interest­
ing question as another project for analysis.
1Oglesby,
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CHAPTER V.
We have touched upon many seemingly diverse topics 
up to this point in our analysis. We began our discussion 
with an examination of the process of polarization of meta­
physical outlook in the social sciences. Opposing trends in 
theoretical and methodological outlook were analyzed as being 
necessary phenomena given the ecomonic and political premises 
which are the realities of social organization in the contem­
porary West. We have traced the dialectical polarization of 
intellectual positions and the metaphysical universe as they 
are rooted in the evolution of society and relations of pro­
duction culminating in the appearance upon the historical 
stage of imperialism. Using dialectics and Marx’s method of 
political economy we have followed the circuitious and logic­
ally necessary emergence of a fetishized conception of history 
mediated through a reified consciousness as a functional con­
sequent of capitalist development.
In embarking upon an experimental tack in order to 
formulate a methodology appropriate to the task of examining 
the specific character of reified consciousness through time, 
we believe that we have adequately laid the groundwork to make 
several general points concerning the nature of contemporary 
scientific endeavor. The unifying metaphysical principle we 
find present throughout the specific cases analyzed here is 
the idea of a hypostatized and supra-historical nature of 
capitalist reality. We have demonstrated how the methodolog­
ical concomitant of this theoretical position implies also a 
specific, "special" definition of "facts". George Lukacs 
writes in discussing this phenomenon notes the opposing 
tendencies to treat facts in either a dialectical or bour­
geois manner.
If, then, the internal structure of "facts" and their 
relations is essentially known in a-historic manner, if 
they are seen as implicated in a process of uninterrupted 
revolution, we must ask where the greatest inexactitude 
lies. It is when the ’facts* are percieved under a form 
of objectivity wherein they are dominated by laws which 
I know with a methodological certainty (or at least pro­
bability) are valid for these facts? Or is it when I 
consciously recognize the consequences of this situation 
and therefore adopt a critical attitude toward the cer­
titude which is achieved, concentrating upon the moments 
in which this historic character, this decisive modifica­
tion manifests itself?
Thus, the historical character of the "facts" which 
science believes it perceives in their "purity" is fated 
to this illusion. As products of historical evolution, 
these facts are not only involved in continued change. 
More than that, they are—■precisely in the structure of 
their objectivity—the product of a specific historic 
epoch: that of capitalism. Consequently, a "science" 
which takes the immediacy of the facts as its basis, 
which sees this form of their objectivity as the point 
of departure for scientific conceptualization, places 
itself simply and dogmatically upon the terrain of cap­
italist society.^
The analyses of literature made in the proceeding 
section were designed to present some parallels, in the sense 
of operating from the same metaphysical stance, of the process 
of degeneration described just above. The basically ideal­
istic character of bourgeois morality, in operating as 
theory divorced from practice leads inevitable to a rejection 
of history; a materially grounded morality, as theory gener­
ated through practice operates to overthrow the phantom 
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stability of capitalist reality, to resolve contradictions 
within the system through history.
Contemporary Western social science, in embracing 
"facts" and rejecting history is taking an ideological 
position. Theoretical and methodological distortions in the 
sociological realm can be seen as analagous to the distortions 
which were sponsored by the writers analyzed above. The 
thread of continuity running through the common metaphysical 
mistake is the inability of moral imperatives to confront the 
reified and a-historical enormity of capitalism successfully.
In conclusion we must ask ourselves the questions 
what is the future of orthodox Western sociology? The 
answer is simple and will be borne out in history. Mao 
Tse-tung has commented (to paraphrase) that revolution is 
the main trend in the world today. The implications for 
the U.S. as an imperialist power and in conjunction its 
moribund body of social thought is obvious. To borrow an 
analysis of the world situation from a communication between 
the Communist Parties of the People's Republic of China and 
the U.S.S.R. concerning international political developments
It is perfectly obvious that in our age the main con­
tent and the chief trends of the historical development 
of human society are no longer determined by imperialism 
but by the world socialist system, by all the progressive 
forces struggling against imperialism for the reorganiza­
tion of society along socialist lines. The contradiction 
between capitalism and socialism is the chief contradic­
tion of our epoch. On the outcome of the struggle of the 
two world systems the destinies of peace, democracy and 
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socialism depend to a decisive extent. And the correla­
tion of forces in the world arena is changing all the 
time in favour of socialism.
The struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and 
Latin America for their national and social liberation, 
and the successes already achieved in this field, the 
growing struggle of the working class, of all the work­
ing people of the capitalist countries against the 
monopolies and against exploitation, in the interest of 
social progress, are of the greatest importance for the 
destinies of the historical development of mankind. 
Socialist revolutions, national-liberation, anti-imperial­
ist and anti-colonial revolutions, peoples democratic 
revolutions, extensive peasant movements, the struggle 
of the masses for the overthrow of facist and other tyr- 
ranical regiemes, general democratic movements against 
national oppression—in our time will these merge into a 
single world revolutionary stream undermining and des­
troying capitalism.2
If the tendency in the world towards universal social­
ist reorganization is realized then and only then will con­
temporary Western sociology be seen for what it has really 
been. As the progress of mankind is marked with the passing 
of capitalism from the historical stage, so with it will go 
the bourgeois intellectual enterprises which have fostered 
the ideological mystifications and contortions which have 
supported it, chief among them bourgeois sociology. Lacking 
the a priori critical nature of art to transcend given reality 
through realism, sociology as a science in rejecting a criti­
cal stance through theoretical and methodological distortion, 
has succeeded in relegating itself (as some future assessment 
of the history of social thought will surely conclude) to the 
status of mere propaganda, simple and vulgar.
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Georg Lukacs, "What is Orthodox Marxism?", op cit., 
p. 28-29.
2Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
in reply to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union, A Proposal Concerning; the General Line of 
the International Communist Movement (Foreign Language Press, 
Peking, 1963), P- 70-71- For an excellent and penetrating 
analysis of the political economy of counter-revolutionary 
trends in the Soviet Union which have sharply undermined 
socialist solidarity internationally, cf. Martin Nicolaus 
The Restoration of Capitalism in the U.S.S.R. (Liberator 
Press, Chicago, 197^)• "On questions of basic theory, the 
Soviet leadership has thrown out the Marxist theory of the 
state as the repressive instrument of a class in favor of the 
view that the state is the representative organ of the whole 
people. They have similarly cut the heart out of the Marxist- 
Leninist theory of the role of the communist party. They have 
distorted the Marxist view on the transition to socialism to 
turn it into the illusion of peaceful overthrow of the bour­
geoisie. They have discarded the core of Lenin's theory of 
imperialism in favor of the myth of "irreversible detente" 
with imperialist powers. This is to mention just a few 
examples.
In foreign policy, the Soviet leadership beginning with 
Krushchev broke the solidarity of the socialist camp by 
forming an alliance with India's expansionism against socialist 
China and with Yugoslav chauvinism against socialist Albania. 
It imposed unjustifiable conditions on its aid to these fra­
ternal countries, and abruptly cut them off when they insisted 
on treatment as equals.
It violated the independence of the Eastern European 
people's democracies, occupied them with its troops, proclaimed 
that their sovreignty was "limited" and turned the majority of 
them into its client-states and dependencies. This, too, was 
merely the beginning.
Most important have been the changes instituted by the new 
Soviet leadership in the economic base of Soviet society. 
They used the power of the Soviet state to nurture, fortify and 
put in command the traces of capitalism that survived in the 
relations of production, while breaking up the dominant 
strongholds of socialist relations. In their economic reforms 
of a decade ago, they erected an out-and-out capitalist 
economic structure of a state-monopoly capitalist type. It is 
today a consolidated economic system that conforms in all 
essential features to the classic analysis of imperialism 
given by Lenin, (p. 4-5).
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